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First Amendment Freedoms and
the Encryption Export Battle:
Deciphering the Importance of
Bernstein v. United States
Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132
(9th Cir. 1999)
"[Elncryption technologies are the most important technological breakthrough
in the last one thousand years. No other technological discovery... will have
a more significant impact on social and political life. Cryptography will
change everything."'
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHERE ENCRYPTION MEETS
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
For many years, a battle has raged over export restrictions on
strong encryption products. Encryption ensures confidential and se-
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cure communications among individuals, and the Commerce Depart-
ment and the State Department have long restricted its export
because of national security concerns. 2 Industry and privacy groups
have fought against the restrictions for various reasons, ranging from
the desire to sell encryption software in new markets to preventing
government from accessing personal communications between indi-
viduals.3 Daniel Bernstein, a computer science graduate student,
challenged these restrictions in 1996, placing himself in the center of
this ongoing battle. 4 In 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
in Bernstein's favor, saying that such restrictions constituted a viola-
tion of the First Amendment.5 This ruling changed the dynamic of the
encryption export debate, and it has helped propel to victory those
who oppose regulations on the technology.
The first part of this casenote provides background information
necessary to understand the history and nature of encryption technol-
ogy and the regulations that restrict its export. The second part pro-
vides a detailed analysis of Bernstein v. United States Department of
Justice.6 The casenote ends with an examination of the competing
views in the encryption export battle and a discussion of the First
Amendment's influential role in the overall conflict.
II. ENCRYPTION AND ITS IMPORTANCE TODAY
Cryptography, the art of secret writing, has existed in some form
since the dawn of history - from the first observers of Egyptian hier-
oglyphs7 to the biblical Daniel's deciphering of handwriting on the
wall.8 It has been a passion and practice of some of history's notable
figures, including Thomas Jefferson who is considered the "Father of
American Cryptography" for his invention of the "wheel cypher" in the
1790s.9 Throughout the ages, cryptography's most visible partici-
pants have been governments and militaries fighting battles and wars
in which intercepted and deciphered messages meant victory or de-
feat.1 0 Approximately thirty years ago, however, cryptography
started taking on greater importance outside the realm of kings and
spies.
2. See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
4. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.
1999).
5. See id. at 1145.
6. 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999).
7. See DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS 71 (1967).
8. See id. at 80; Daniel 5:5-29.
9. See KAIm, supra note 7, at 192-195.
10. See WALTER B. WRISTON, THE TWILIGHT OF SovEIGNrY: How THE INFORMATION
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD 157 (1992).
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Modern encryption emerged during the 1970s as a result of govern-
ment and industry research and interaction - the primary players
being Stanford and MIT researchers, IBM, and the National Security
Agency."' This research produced two important breakthroughs in
cryptosystems: (1) the Data Encryption Standard (DES); and (2) RSA
(the Rivest-Shamir-Aldeman algorithm).12 These new technologies,
combined with the advent of other modern communication technolo-
gies, such as the fax machine and internet, were major steps in en-
cryption's expansion beyond governmental and military usage.' 3 The
efforts of software engineer Philip Zimmerman took the process even
further. He developed Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), encryption
software for ordinary e-mail, and published it as freeware in 1991.14
This made encryption available worldwide and greatly concerned the
United States government, prompting it to initiate a three-year crimi-
nal investigation of Zimmerman based on U.S. export restrictions.15
While worldwide security for sending messages would seem to be a
positive development, such protection worried officials concerned with
national security. In order to understand these governmental fears, it
is important to recognize how modern encryption works.
A. Modern Encryption at Work
Modern digital encryption has been described as a "lockbox" placed
around a message by the sending party that can only be retrieved by
someone with the appropriate electronic key.16 The value of the tech-
nology is its ability to maintain the secrecy and security of the mes-
sage throughout the delivery process. One commentator states:
The technology is the equivalent of the lock on the front door of a house.
Without a lock, the house would have limited value and would be difficult to
sell. With a relatively low-cost lock in place, the contents of the house are
secure, and the value of the house increases tremendously. 17
This is the general function of encryption, but it is necessary to
examine more technical aspects and terminology's to understand
where governmental anxieties originate. One scholar provides this
11. See John T. Soma & Charles P. Henderson, Encryption, Key Recovery, and Com-
mercial Trade Secret Assets: A Proposed Legislative Model, 25 RUTGERS CoM-
PUTER & TECH. L.J. 97, 103 (1999).
12. See id.
13. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir.
1999).
14. For more information on Phil Zimmerman, see his website (visited Sept. 8, 2000)<http'/www.pgp.com/phil/>.
15. See id.
16. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1148 (Bright, J., dissenting).
17. James Gerstenzang, Clinton Removes Export Limits on Encryption Technology
Computers, L.A. TnsS, Sept. 17, 1999, at C1.
18. For a glossary of encryption terminology, see BERT-JAA Koops, THE CRYPTO CON
TovEmsy: A KEY CoNFLicT IN THE INFORIATION SocmETY 269-70 (1999); Center
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concise explanation of the encryption process: "using a computer pro-
gram, an encryption algorithm (a mathematical equation) converts a
plaintext message and encodes it, using a key, into apparently
unintelligible ciphertext."1 9 Each component is critical to the process,
but it is the electronic key that is at the center of the encryption con-
troversy. Keys are used to encrypt and decrypt messages. There are
primarily two types of encryption systems: 1) private key systems,
also known as "secret key," "single key," or "symmetric" key systems;
2) public key systems, also known as "public-private key," "dual key,"
or "asymmetric" key systems.20 In private key systems, both the
sender and receiver use the same key. In public key systems, two keys
are used - a public key that is posted on the internet or elsewhere
that can only be used to encrypt the message, and a private key that is
held by the recipient party solely to decode the message. Public key
systems are more advantageous in that they avoid the danger of
transporting the same key between parties.
In each of the two systems, keys consist of "bits," which are the
binary units of information that have the value 0 or 1.21 In order to
decode a message by "brute force" (i.e., without having the key), it is
necessary to try every possible key combination. 2 2 Therefore, the
longer the key, the more difficult it is to decipher the message. The
strength of the encryption key grows exponentially with each addi-
tional bit.23 For example, a one-bit key would have two possibilities,
but a two-bit key would have four possibilities. The Digital Encryp-
tion Standard (DES), the standard since the 1970s, uses a 56-bit key,
and thus has 256 possibilities (or approximately 7.2057594 x 1016 pos-
sibilities).24 Philip Zimmerman's PGP troubled government officials
because it used a 128-bit key.2 5 It is possible to crack a 56-bit key
using a number of high-powered computers,2 6 but current technology
would take several trillion times the age of the universe to crack a
for Democracy & Technology, Glossary of Cryptographic Terms, (visited June 26,
2000) <http'//www.cdt.org/crypto/glossary.shmtl>.
19. Kurt M. Saunders, The Regulation of Internet Encryption Technologies: Separat-
ing the Wheat from the Chaff, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 945, 947-
48 (1999).
20. See id. at 948.
21. See Dan Froomkin and Amy Branson, Deciphering Encryption, (last visited Sept.
8, 2000), <http'//www.washingtonpost.conwp-srv/politics/special/encryption/en-
cryption.htm>. Froomkin and Branson provide a user-friendly explanation of the
terminology and mathematics behind bits and keys, for which the author is
appreciative.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
26. The Electronic Frontier Foundation broke the DES code in less than 3 days using
a computer that cost $250,000. See Koops, supra note 18, at 35-36 n.3.
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128-bit key.2 7 Uncrackable encryption technology in the hands of ter-
rorists, drug smugglers, tax evaders, and foreign governments could
frustrate U.S. law enforcement and foreign policy interests.
B. Encryption Regulations
Despite its possible illegal uses, encryption is not regulated in any
manner within the United States; individuals can sell, manufacture,
use, and import encryption technology of any strength.28 There are
restrictions, however, on the export of strong encryption technology.
Such restrictions are not a new development,29 but opposition to them
has reached fever pitch in recent years. The Arms Export Control Act
(AECA)30 and the Export Administration Act (EAA)31 govern the ex-
port of encryption. Prior to 1996, the State Department was charged
with promulgating International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR)32 to implement AECA. Under these regulations, encryption
software was frequently designated as a "munition" and placed on the
United States Munition List (USIVIL) pursuant to ITAR.33 In 1996,
President Clinton issued an Executive Order transferring jurisdiction
over nonmilitary encryption products from the State Department to
the Department of Commerce.3 4 The Executive Order mandated that
nonmilitary encryption products that normally would be placed on the
USML would instead be moved to the Commerce Control List (CCL)
under the Commerce Department-administered Export Administra-
tion Regulations (EAR).35 Encryption products designed solely for
military purposes remained on the USML and under ITAR.36 Under
both ITAR and EAR, individuals must obtain a.license prior to export-
ing certain types of encryption technology.37 It was in this context
that Daniel Bernstein and the First Amendment took center stage.
27. See Soma & Henderson, supra note 11, at 127.
28. See Saunders, supra note 19, at 949-50.
29. See Joe Salkowski, Encryption Campaign Ends with a Triumph for Common
Sense, Cm. TIUm., Sept. 27, 1999, at 6 ("Government restrictions on encryption
date back to the days of the earliest computers, which were used to decode mili-
tary messages during World War II.").
30. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994).
31. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1994).
32. 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1999).
33. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994).
34. See Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767, 68,574 (1996).
35. 15 C.F.R. § 730-99 (1999).
36. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D.
Cal. 1997).
37. 15 C.F.R. §734.2 (1999). For detailed background information on the encryption
regulations, see Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 974 F. Supp. 1288
(N.D. Cal. 1997) and Saunders, supra note 19. The author is indebted to these
sources for their statutory citations and understanding of the regulations.
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III. BERNSTEIN V. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Bernstein ran into the encryption export restrictions in 1992. As a
graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley, he devel-
oped "Snuffle," a zero-delay private-key encryption system. The ex-
pression of his encryption system took three different forms: (1) a
paper with Bernstein's analysis and math equations; (2) two computer
programs written in "C" - his source code; (3) instructions in English,
which were basically a translation of his source code into prose form.
Bernstein wanted to present his work within academic and scientific
communities worldwide. He submitted a commodity jurisdiction re-
quest to the State Department to determine whether his work fell
under ITAR. The State Department responded affirmatively, saying
that because his program was a munition under ITAR, he would need
a license to export the paper, source code, or instructions. A series of
contentious exchanges through the mail ensued between Bernstein
and the State Department.3 8 When this failed to produce an agree-
ment, Bernstein filed suit in 1996 to challenge the constitutionality of
the ITAR regulations.
In the initial case of Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice,39
the district court held that source code was speech for First Amend-
ment purposes; thus, Bernstein's claim was justiciable. In the second
hearing of Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice,40 the district
court ruled that particular ITAR provisions were unconstitutional
under the First Amendment as prior restraints on speech. The court
then extended its rationale of Bernstein II to the new EAR regulations
under the Commerce Department in the third case of Bernstein v.
United States Dep't of Justice.41 The appeal of Bernstein III resulted
in the Ninth Circuit opinion that is the subject of this casenote.
A three judge panel from the Ninth Circuit reviewed Bernstein's
case, and Judge Fletcher provided the Court's official opinion. The
court affirmed the lower court's holding in Bernstein III that certain
Commerce Department EAR regulations violated the First Amend-
ment and enjoined enforcement of the particular regulations.42 In its
analysis, the court began by examining a brief history of cryptography
and noted that "[t]he interception and deciphering of foreign commu-
nications has long played an important part in our nation's national
38. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF "Letters"Archive, (last visited Aug. 31,
2000) <http'/www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Crypto/Crypto-export/Bernsteincase/Let-
ters/>.
39. 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Bernstein 1").
40. 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Bernstein I').
41. 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("Bernstein III').
42. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1147.
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security efforts."43 The court then discussed pertinent portions of the
EAR regulations, particularly focusing on how the definition of "ex-
port" was broader for encryption software than for other products
under the EAR. For example, "export" for encryption included publi-
cation via internet, CD-ROM, and floppy disks, even though source
code printed on paper was not subject to the regulations.44
Following its discussion of history and the regulations, the court
discussed the First Amendment doctrine of prior restraint.45 Judge
Fletcher emphasized the special reverence accorded the First Amend-
ment and the suspicion that arises with prior restraints on speech in
licensing schemes, such as the EAR.46 As part of his prior restraint
analysis, Judge Fletcher had to determine whether the regulations
bore "a close enough nexus to expression."4 7 The government argued
that encryption source code was not sufficiently related to expression
because of its functional ability to control a computer. Nonetheless,
Judge Fletcher rejected this argument and found that source code was
expressive for First Amendment purposes; furthermore, he found that
such code was not capable of controlling a computer.43
The court asserted that source code served the same expressive
function for programmers as equations do for mathematicians or
graphs do for economists. 4 9 It also noted how, in this particular case,
Bernstein specifically used his source code as a means to speak out
against the current regulations - in other words, "political expres-
sion."50 The court concluded by stressing the narrowness of its opin-
ion in so far as it applied only to source code and not to all software
products, and ended with dicta suggesting that regulations on encryp-
tion may endanger other fundamental rights beyond the First
Amendment.51
Judge Bright's concurrence placed him squarely between Judge
Fletcher's opinion and the dissent. Judge Bright acknowledged that
source code has both communicative purposes as expression as well as
functional purposes for controlling computers. His concurrence de-
clined to resolve the issue; rather, Judge Bright suggested that the
United States Supreme Court review the matter.
Judge Nelson's dissent viewed computer source code as an inher-
ently functional device that is more like conduct than speech. In his
view, because source code is conduct, the regulations were valid and
43. Id. at 1137.
44. See id. at 1137-38 (citing 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.2(b)(9)(B)(i), § 734.3(b)).
45. See infra note 87.
46. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1139.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 1142.
49. See id. at 1141.
50. Id. at 1141 n.14.
51. See id. at 1145-46.
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should be enforced. He acknowledged that programmers may occa-
sionally use source code as a communication device, but he main-
tained that such use is rare. Judge Nelson concluded by stating that
Bernstein may indeed have an "as-applied" First Amendment claim,
but not a facial challenge to the regulations. 52
On September 30, 1999, the Ninth Circuit voted to withdraw the
three-judge panel opinion and rehear Bernstein's case by the en banc
court.5 3 On April 11, 2000, the court decided to remand the case to the
district court in light of the new encryption export regulations adopted
on January 14, 2000.54 While the opinion discussed above is no longer
the law, it is still an important case because of its influence on the
larger encryption export battle. It provides insight into the competing
interests and issues at stake in the debate. These issues and the role
the First Amendment has played in determining the battle's outcome
are the subjects of the next section.
IV. THE BATTLE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENTS
EFFECT ON IT
A. The Battle Lines
To fully understand the importance of Bernstein, it is necessary to
explore further the present state of the encryption export battle.
Three general positions in the war have emerged: (1) those who are in
favor of restrictions on encryption exports; (2) those who oppose any
such restrictions; (3) those who are in the middle (i.e., individuals in
favor of some restrictions, but who believe encryption should be unreg-
ulated for the most part).55 By examining these groups and recent
trends in the debate, it is possible to see what effect the First Amend-
ment analysis and result in Bernstein have had on the ultimate out-
come of the encryption export battle.
The proponents of restrictions are primarily the government, law
enforcement agencies, militaries, and those who see encryption as a
threat to national security. These entities and individuals strongly
support export restrictions on encryption. Some even support forms of
domestic regulation, such as requiring individuals to automatically
make a copy of their encryption key for deposit with the government
52. See id. at 1149 (dissenting opinion).
53. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 1999 WL 782073 (9th Cir.).
54. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, 9th Circuit decision to dismiss appeal and
remand back to district court (Apr. 11, 2000), (last visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http'/
www.eff.org/bernstein/Legal/20000411.remandorder.html>.
55. See, e.g., Educom Review Staff, Encryption Technology & Crime: Searching for a
Neutral Zone, 32 EDUCOM REv. 5 (last visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http'//www.edu
cause.edu/pub/er/review/reviewArticles/32538.html> (interviewing Dorothy Den-
ning, who believes regulations should allow for government access, but only
under tightly controlled circumstances).
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or a designated third party (a process known as "key escrow" or key
recovery"). 5 6 Governments and militaries worry that unlimited access
to strong encryption will give foreign governments and individuals the
tools for "information warfare" - the "purposeful and strategic use of
information, the ability to cripple a country by decrypting its coded
messages, seizing its financial centers, and disabling its communica-
tion hubs."57 More importantly, foreign governments with strong en-
cryption are not as susceptible to U.S. attempts to intercept and
decode their communications. As one scholar notes, "Though the tech-
nology has changed dramatically, the intent has remained the same:
to read the enemy's messages and to keep one's own secret."5 8 On the
other hand, some have suggested the U.S. government continue its
consistent support of restrictions in order to preserve good relations
with other countries, such as France, which maintain very strict con-
trols on encryption.5 9
Law enforcement officials, such as U.S. Attorney General Janet
Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh, additionally fear that strong en-
cryption will increase the amount of crime, as criminals utilize encryp-
tion to conceal illegal activities. Freeh, one of the most outspoken
figures in favor of restrictions, testified that "the widespread availabil-
ity and use of robust, non-recoverable encryption ultimately will dev-
astate our ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism."60 Drug
smugglers, terrorists, distributors of pornography, and gambling ring-
leaders are classes of criminals that may come to mind as likely en-
cryption-users, 6 1 but tax-evaders and money-launderers will also
enjoy protection in the new world of on-line transactions and money in
56. See, e.g., Dena R. Klopfenstein, Comment, Deciphering the Encryption Debate: A
Constitutional Analysis of Current Regulations and a Prediction for the Future,
48 EMORY L.J. 765, 784 (1999) (FBI Director Louis Freeh predicting that the FBI
would recommend a requirement for a key recovery system on domestic and im-
ported encryption products).
57. Id. at 765.
58. WXisToN, supra note 10, at 154.
59. See Mark Stahlman, The Big Picture: The Encryption Enigma - Look Behind
the Hype to See the Real Reasons for Export Restrictions, INFORMATION WEEK,
April 24, 1995, Issue 524 (last visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http://www.information
week.comI524I24uwms.htm>. It is important to note that France has liberalized
its encryption controls somewhat since 1995, but Stahlman's argument may still
ring true for France and other countries. See Koops, supra note 18, at 104-05,
112-13; Center for Democracy & Technology, Encryption Milestones, (last visited
Sept. 8, 2000), <http//www.cdt.org/crypto/milestones.shtml> (January 19, 1999
- "France announces plans to revise its traditionally conservative stance on en-
cryption policy.").
60. A Switch On Encryption, Editorial, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1999, at B06.
61. See, e.g., Klopfenstein, supra note 56, at 772 n.55 (listing congressional commit-
tee hearings that discussed encryption use by Call Cartel, other violent criminals,
and a gambling ring).
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the form of "digital blips."62 Thus, from the FBI to the IRS, govern-
ment officials hope encryption restrictions will enable them to track
criminals and build sufficient cases to convict them.
The contrary view regarding encryption decries any regulations on
the export or use of the technology. Industry, privacy groups, academ-
ics, and those who view government encryption regulations as an in-
trusion by a "Big Brother" government share this perspective.
Regardless of the subgroup, the same argument surfaces continually:
"Anyone who wants strong encryption can already get it."63 Industry
uses the argument to bolster its position that it is being denied access
to a multi-billion dollar market from which businesses in other coun-
tries are reaping the benefits. U.S. businesses point to the desirability
of security in e-commerce and the potential for even greater consumer
confidence in on-line transactions.6 4 These businesses believe market
forces should determine whether key escrow is necessary and argue
that strong encryption actually decreases crime. 6 5 Furthermore, they
point to industry's already successful attempts to circumvent the re-
strictions by establishing foreign subsidiaries to sell the encryption
technology overseas. 66
Privacy groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and
the Center for Democracy and Technology, use the argument to sup-
port their contention that restrictions unnecessarily burden scientific
expression, hinder human rights in other countries,6 7 and endanger
individual privacy interests from government intrusion. Additionally,
those who specialize in encryption argue that encryption possesses
two unique features that are not conducive to regulation: (1) dissemi-
nation of the technology is necessary in order to allow others the op-
portunity to crack the system and find weaknesses in the program; (2)
any openings in the program, such as key escrow, provide additional
possibilities for a security breach, and thus inherently weaken the
program.68 Others argue that the restrictions are simply outdated -
they may have worked when an encryption system was a "room-size
collection of vacuum tubes and switches," but they do not make sense
in a world where the software can be "e-mailed around the world in
the time it takes a customs inspector to uncap his pen."6 9 Finally, this
group heralds the tremendous potential for good from the technology,
62. See Josh McHugh, Politics for the Really Cool, FORBES MAG., Sept. 8, 1997, (last
visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http/www.forbes.com/Forbes/97/0908/6005172a.htm>.
63. Salkowski, supra note 29, at 6.
64. See Christina A. Cockburn, Comment, Where the United States Goes the World
Will Follow - Won't It?, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 491 (1999).
65. See Klopfenstein, supra note 56, at 789.
66. See Cockburn, supra note 64, at 507.
67. See Koops, supra note 18, at 54-55.
68. See Klopfenstein, supra note 56, at 777, 789.
69. Salkowski, supra note 29, at 6.
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from creating digital signatures to securing the privacy of vitally im-
portant communications. They believe encryption regulations do not
prevent criminal activity, but instead serve only to keep the strongest
encryption out of the hands of those who need it most.70
The final perspective on encryption falls between the two ends of
the spectrum. This group of "middle-grounders" supports some regu-
lation on encryption but primarily favors freedom from regulation.
These individuals have not given up on governmental regulation as an
effective tool to protect national security, and they are willing to sacri-
fice some privacy for that purpose. Dorothy Denning, a computer sci-
ence professor, articulated this middle-ground view. She stated, "We
have never really had absolute privacy with our records or our elec-
tronic communications - government agencies have always been able
to gain access with appropriate court orders."71 The problem with this
viewpoint is that regulation which truly balances privacy interests
with government interests results in insufficient protection of national
security,72 and there is some doubt as to whether such tailored and
balanced regulations can provide any protection at all.
Recent developments favor those who oppose regulations on en-
cryption software. Since the inception of the encryption battle, Con-
gress has proposed legislation to deal with the issue; however, few
bills have gained the approval of both Congress and the President.
What can be said regarding the proposals is that, even in the most
restrictive bills, there appears to be a trend toward liberalizing the
export restrictions. Two proposals in the 106th Congress dealing with
the export regulations are the Promote Reliable On-Line Transactions
to Encourage Commerce and Trade (PROTECT) Act of 199973 and the
Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act.74 The PRO-
TECT Act was sponsored by Senator John McCain and is the more
restrictive of the two bills. The bill seeks to establish an Encryption
Export Advisory Board that would recommend exemptions to encryp-
tion technology "where similar, foreign produced products are gener-
ally, and publicly available, or where such foreign produced products
will be in the marketplace within 12 months."75 Thus, while the bill
still seeks to restrict encryption, it recognizes the wide availability of
encryption through foreign outlets. In fact, the Committee report
states that "[t]he worldwide ubiquity of encryption makes the technol-
ogy impossible to control."76 The SAFE Act in the House provides an
70. See Koops, supra note 18, at 130-31.
71. Educom Review Staff, supra note 55.
72. See Klopfenstein, supra note 56, at 806-07.
73. S. 798, 106' Cong. (1999).
74. H.R. 850, 106th Cong. (1999).
75. S. REP. No. 106-142, 106th Cong., 1st Session (August 5, 1999), 1999 WL 594573
(Leg. Hist.).
76. Id.
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even more liberal approach to encryption software than the PROTECT
Act. Both proposals exhibit the strong movement of the overall battle
toward fewer restrictions on encryption exports.
The White House has also significantly tempered its support for
strict encryption regulations. On September 16, 1999, the Clinton Ad-
ministration announced plans to further liberalize its policy on en-
cryption export restrictions. 7 7 The new regulations, which took effect
on January 14, 2000,78 allow publicly available encryption source code
to be exported without review or classification, as long as the exporter
submits written notification of the internet site or a copy of the source
code to the Bureau of Export Administration.79 On July 17, 2000, the
Clinton Administration announced even further updates to the export
regulations.SO If adopted, these regulations would allow anyone to ex-
port without a license any encryption product to an individual or gov-
ernment entity in the European Union, Australia, Norway, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland. 8 1
The new revisions would also make it clear that publicly available
source code and the object code that results from compiling it would
receive the same treatment.8 2 Proponents for the free-flow of encryp-
tion software see the Clinton Administration's actions as a sign of sur-
render to the realities of the easily-spread technology.8 3
These changes in policy have placed anti-regulation advocates at
the doorstep of victory in the export battle. In fact, the Commerce
Department has given Daniel Bernstein permission to publish his
source code on-line.8 4 However, Bernstein's attorney contends that al-
lowing publication on the internet while still retaining prohibitions
against knowingly exporting code to states supportive of terrorism is
"'an area of ambiguity that remains." 8 5 The export regulations spe-
77. See Statement by Press Secretary on New Approach to Encryption, Sept. 16, 1999,
1999 WL 721387 (White House).
78. See 65 Fed. Reg. 2492 (2000). The regulations are codified at 15 C.F.R. Parts 734,
740, 742, 770, 772, and 774. Id.
79. Id. at 2493.
80. See The Bureau of Export Administration, Statement by the Press Secretary: Ad-
ministration Updates Encryption Export Policy, July 17, 2000, (last visited Sept.
8, 2000) <http'//www.bxa.doc.gov/press/2000/WhiteHouseEncAnnounce.html>.
81. See id.
82. See The Bureau of Export Administration, Administration Considers Further
Liberalization to Encryption Export Policy, (last visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http'l/
www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/July2KproposedRegSum.html>.
83. See Salkowski, supra note 29, at 6. But cf A Switch on Encryption, supra note
60, at 806 (suspecting the Clinton Administration's announcement is based more
on political considerations than national security concerns).
84. See Sharon Cleary, U.S. Lets Scientist Post Source Code for Encryption Software
on Web Site, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2000, at B6 (2000 WL-WSJ 3019346).
85. Id. The regulation at issue is codified at 15 C.F.R. § 740.13(e)(2) (2000) and lists
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as supporters of
terrorism.
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cifically state that making source code available on the internet for
anyone's use "would not establish 'knowledge' of a prohibited ex-
port,"s6 which appears to address Bernstein's question. Nonetheless,
if there is an ambiguity, the district court's determination of Bern-
stein's First Amendment claim could serve an important role in
resolving the dispute.
B. Which Side Should the First Amendment Favor?
Bernstein's challenge forced the First Amendment to take sides in
the encryption export debate. The Bernstein court was faced with the
task of determining whether source code was "speech" for purposes of
First Amendment protection.8 7 The well-settled First Amendment
test for symbolic speech established in United States v. O'Brien88
would seem to provide a clear solution for courts in making this deter-
mination. However, the unique attributes of encryption source code
and the imprecise balancing of the O'Brien test have resulted in courts
reaching disparate conclusions while searching for the perfect analogy
to solve the constitutional question.
Encryption source code does not fall under the traditional First
Amendment categories of the written or spoken word, since it can be
both expressive and functional.8 9 However, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that First Amendment protection can extend to cer-
tain types of conduct or "symbolic speech."90 The Court addressed the
issue of symbolic conduct in United States v. O'Brien.9 1 In 1966,
David Paul O'Brien and three others burned their Selective Service
registration certificates on the steps of a courthouse in protest of the
Vietnam War.92 A crowd witnessed the event and began to attack the
men.93 O'Brien was later arrested and convicted of knowingly de-
stroying his draft card, a federal offense.94 He argued that the law
under which he was charged was an unconstitutional abridgement of
86. 15 C.F.R. § 740.13(e)(3) (2000).
87. The Bernstein court approached the broader issue of whether the government's
licensing scheme constituted a prior restraint of speech, which required it to "de-
termine whether encryption source code [was] expression for First Amendment
purposes." Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1139. The court's determination of this sub-
issue is the focus of this casenote, and the broader issues of prior restraint and
government licensing are beyond the scope of this inquiry.
88. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
89. See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000).
90. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
91. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
92. See id. at 369-70.
93. See id. at 369.
94. See id. at 369-70.
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speech. 95 The Supreme Court refused to endorse the view that all ac-
tivities with some expressive purpose are "speech" under the First
Amendment 9 6; rather, they acknowledged that "a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."9 7 The
Court introduced a four-part test to determine whether a regulation
that restricts symbolic speech is justified:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest. 9 8
The O'Brien court determined that the statute's purpose to insure the
smooth functioning of the Selective Service System was a substantial
governmental interest unrelated to suppressing free speech and in
line with Congress' power to raise armies. 99
Only three cases have addressed the issue of encryption source
code's expressive value in relation to the government's export restric-
tions - Bernstein, 10 0 Karn v. United States Dep't of State,101 and
Junger v. Daley.102 The cases have similar fact patterns, but each
court has approached the issue in a different way, which highlights
the difficulty of applying O'Brien principles to a complex technological
issue. The first part of the O'Brien test that requires the regulation to
fall within the government's constitutional power has not been chal-
lenged in any of the encryption cases.103 Likewise, O'Brien's second
requirement of a substantial governmental interest has not raised sig-
nificant objections because national security, foreign policy, and na-
tional defense are legitimately important interests.10 4
Divergence among the courts occurs in the third and fourth parts
of the O'Brien test. O'Brien's third requirement forces courts to decide
whether the government's interest in national security is related to
95. See id. at 370.
96. See id. at 376; accord Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (stating that "[iut
is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes - for example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a
shopping mall - but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the
protection of the First Amendment.").
97. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
98. Id. at 377.
99. See id. at 382.
100. 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d
1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
101. 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), remanded for reconsideration, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (unpublished disposition).
102. 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev'd, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).
103. See, e.g., Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1996).
104. See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11.
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the suppression of free speech when the government regulates the ex-
port of encryption source code.105 Courts cannot decide this issue
without first determining whether free speech is implicated in the
case before them, and specifically, whether encryption source code is
"speech." In their attempts to answer these questions, courts have
scoured the archives of First Amendment cases in search of appropri-
ate analogies to encryption source code that will dictate the right
result.
The use of O'Brien has prompted courts to make the comparison or
distinction between the writing of encryption source code and the
burning of a flag or draft card in protest.o6 The Bernstein court
stretched the analogy of protest when it characterized Bernstein's at-
tempt to end-run the encryption regulations as "political expres-
sion."10 7 Both Bernstein and the latest Junger case analogized
computer scientist's expressive uses of source code to similar mathe-
maticians' and economists' uses of equations or graphs.' 0 8 However,
the initial Junger case concluded that such analogies overemphasized
the expressive uses of source code and did not capture the essence of
source code's functionality.' 0 9 The court stated, "Unlike instructions,
a manual, or a recipe, source code actually performs the function it
describes."110 The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's
choice of these analogies and reversed the decision."' The court
chose instead to utilize the Supreme Court's declaration that the "art-
work of Jackson Pollack, the music of Arnold Schoenberg, or the Jab-
berwocky verse of Lewis Carroll" is "unquestionably shielded" by the
First Amendment.1 2 The comparison of encryption source code to a
musical score had particular appeal to the court because, like encryp-
tion, "a musical score cannot be read by the majority of the public but
can be used as a means of communication among musicians."113
Each of the analogies utilized by the courts appears to make a logi-
cal connection to a strand in the bundle of attributes that makes en-
cryption source code what it is. However, none of the comparisons
accurately encapsulates the entire nature of source code. A computer
scientist may wish to make a political statement by writing source
105. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
106. See, e.g., Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 716-17 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (distin-
guishing the clear message communicated by protests with flags in Spence v.
State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) from any message sent by functional encryption source code).
107. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1141 n.14.
108. See Junger, 209 F.3d at 484; Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1141.
109. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
110. Id.
111. See Junger, 209 F.3d at 484.
112. Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995)).
113. Junger, 209 F.3d at 484.
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code, but it is difficult to argue that the statement will be understood
as easily as a protest on a courthouse steps during a time of war. 1 4
Mathematical equations and graphs are the closest approximations to
the appearance of source code and its potential for dangerous uses, but
they are not quite identical to source code in their functionality (par-
ticularly graphs). The musical score analogy may be the best fit to
encryption source code because a musical score facilitates music (pro-
tected speech) in a way similar to the manner in which encryption is
used to facilitate communications among individuals (protected
speech). However, the musical score analogy does not reflect the com-
plexity of source code's potential connection to international terrorism
and other foreign policy concerns, which may decrease its attractive-
ness to some courts. With a complex issue and such an array of awk-
ward analogies for courts to choose, it should not be surprising that
courts have not reached a consensus on whether source code is speech.
The fourth part of the O'Brien test requires courts to determine if
the incidental restriction on free expression is no greater than neces-
sary to further the government's interest.1' 5 This is a question of a
regulation's tailoring, and the answer depends largely on the courts'
conclusions to the prior parts of the O'Brien test. In encryption cases,
source code's relationship to object code also tends to further compli-
cate a court's determination as to the extent of the government's inter-
est. Programmers take source code, compile it, and transform it into
object code, which is the series of O's and l's capable of running a com-
puter (i.e., completely functional encryption software). The dichotomy
between object code and source code is relevant in the technical com-
puter sense, but for the purposes of export regulations, source code
and object code can blur. The Bernstein court expressly declined to
address whether object code is expression under the First Amend-
ment,1' 6 but in practical terms, it might as well have. If source code is
expression and is fully protected under the First Amendment, then
restrictions on object code will not be very effective. Software for com-
piling source code is not universally compatible, but it is typically
available.117 Foreign governments and individuals could receive un-
restricted source code and easily compile it into object code. In this
scenario, regulations would have practically no effect in stopping the
flow of encryption technology overseas.
114. Compare encryption cases with Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (dis-
cussing how "the expressive, overtly political nature" of flag-burning at the Re-
publican National Convention was "both intentional and overwhelmingly
apparent") and Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (stating
that an American flag flown with an attached peace symbol as a reaction to the
U.S. invasion of Cambodia was a "direct" and "likely to be understood" message).
115. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
116. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1141 n.15.
117. See Junger, 209 F.3d at 483.
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The Karn case also challenges the rational relationship between
the government's interest and its means. Philip Karn submitted two
commodity jurisdiction requests to the State Department for permis-
sion to export Applied Cryptography,11 8 a book that includes complete
source code for strong encryption software and permission to export a
computer disk containing verbatim copies of source code from Applied
Cryptography. The State Department determined that the book did
not fall under its jurisdiction under ITAR, but the diskette did and
was classified as a munition. The court held that the regulations were
content-neutral and should be upheld.119 Karn raises issues regard-
ing the rationality of the government's restrictions on encryption. If
foreign countries can obtain copies of books that contain source code
for strong encryption technology, then one must wonder why computer
disks and CD-ROMs are prohibited from export. Disks do make
source code easier to manipulate and utilize, and books traditionally
have strong First Amendment protection. Yet, this assertion lacks
persuasiveness because foreigners will still have access to the critical
information. The rationality of the regulations is further challenged
by the lack of any domestic regulations on encryption. If one of the
government's primary interests is in protecting the safety of its citi-
zens from acts of terrorism or violence, that interest is not guarded
from internal disturbances plotted over secure e-mail.120
The arguments against classifying encryption source code as pro-
tected symbolic speech may have a slight edge in the search for the
most appropriate analogy due to encryption's functionality and its
lack of a clearly understood message, but the rationality of the export
regulations is still an open question. The reversal of Junger has given
encryption proponents a favorable 2-1 majority in encryption export
cases, and the trend is likely to continue. Courts may tend to side with
the holdings in Bernstein and Junger because of the possible expres-
sive uses of source code, the fear of stifling a new technology, the
seemingly irrational regulations, the recognition of an outside world
where encryption technology is widely available, and the awareness
that regulation is increasingly disfavored by Congress, the President,
and large segments of American society. For better or for worse, the
First Amendment has weighed in on the side of the encryption export-
ers, and in the case of Bernstein, it may have set events in motion to
secure long-term victory for free speech allies, even if courts deter-
mine later that the First Amendment should not protect such
activities.
118. BRUCE Scmm=R, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY (1994).
119. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10.
120. See, e.g., Kevin Whitelow and Joellen Perry, Men in Black, U.S. NEws & WoRLD
REP., Dec. 13, 1999, at 22 (noting use of encryption by professional activists to
organize shutdown of the World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle).
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C. Future Implications
As the Bernstein case begins anew at the district court level, there
are at least three possible implications of future Bernstein decisions.
First, if the district court and Ninth Circuit continue to find that en-
cryption export regulations offend the First Amendment, the victory
march will continue for opponents of the regulations as the liberaliz-
ing trend gains momentum. This result would make it very difficult
for both pro-regulation advocates and "middle-grounders" to impose
even minimal restrictions on the export of encryption technology.
Continued favorable rulings for anti-regulation forces would stifle at-
tempts by government and others to regulate domestic encryption
products, as well. If the courts consistently hold that source code is
expression, they may open a door for First Amendment protection for
other forms of software and code in the future.
The second possible scenario is that the courts will reverse course
and find that encryption export regulations do not violate the First
Amendment, allowing government to maintain a foothold in the area.
Industry and privacy groups would need to consider alternative legal
arguments, such as the Fourth Amendment, 121 because law enforce-
ment and government officials would be able to advocate even
stronger encryption controls. Because the current export restrictions
do not protect the U.S. from domestic criminals who have unlimited
access to strong encryption, officials could reasonably target this
group next. 122 With the ability to regulate encryption, Congress and
the President could continue to search for arrangements that strike a
balance between national security and the interests of industry and
privacy groups. A favorable result for the pro-regulation forces would
also be a positive development for those in the middle that support
minimal restrictions. However, even with a court victory in favor of
restrictions, the mood of the country would need to shift significantly
to halt the momentum of anti-regulation forces and to make more re-
strictive regulations feasible.
The third and final implication is the possibility that by the time
the courts reach a consensus on this issue, the export regulations will
be virtually non-existent or so easily bypassed that Bernstein will
stand as a symbol of a bygone era. Industries have already found
ways to export encryption in response to the market's demand for
strong encryption both domestically and internationally. 123 Demand
121. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1146 ("Viewed from this perspective, the government's
efforts to retard progress in cryptography may implicate the Fourth Amendment,
as well as the right to speak anonymously, the right against compelled speech,
and the right to informational privacy." (citations omitted)).
122. For a description of a foreign national taking advantage of available encryption
during a stay in the U.S., see McHugh, supra note 62.
123. See Cockburn, supra note 64, at 507.
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for this technology will continue to increase as American and Cana-
dian online retailers seek greater protection in an industry expected to
generate $36.6 billion in 1999.124 New technologies are already avail-
able to bypass current restrictions. These innovative technologies,
such as "chaffing and winnowing,"'125 fall outside the encryption regu-
lations, yet provide "encryption-like" security protection. There is
even discussion of future encryption systems that will function accord-
ing to the laws of quantum physics and "guarantee absolute security
for eternity."'12 6 All sides must prepare for the possible consequences
if technology does move beyond Bernstein and the First Amendment
before the issue is resolved. This applies particularly to pro-regula-
tion advocates, because they will not be able to rely comfortably on the
efficacy of export restrictions even if the courts declare such restric-
tions constitutional. 1 27
V. CONCLUSION: THE GREATER IMPORTANCE
OF BERNSTEIN
Although Bernstein's case is still in the court system, its legacy
may already be established. The encryption export battle has moved
steadily in favor of anti-regulation groups since Bernstein first started
to challenge the system in 1992. The Bernstein decision in 1999 bol-
stered the anti-regulation cause and provided the Clinton Administra-
tion with a strong incentive to reevaluate its stance on encryption and
124. See S. REP. No. 106-142, supra note 75.
125. "Chaffing and winnowing" was proposed by Ronald Rivest in 1998. It involves
breaking a message into packets ("good" packets, or "wheat") and attaching an
authentication code to each one. Similar packets are then created ("bad" packets,
or "chaff') and interspersed with the "good" packets. The recipient of the message
uses the correct authentication key to separate the "wheat" from the "chaff." En-
cryption is not involved in the process because the entire message is visible at all
times. For a detailed explanation of "chaffing and winnowing," see Saunders,
supra note 19, at 953-57.
126. SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BooK: THE EVOLUTION OF SECRECY FROM MARY QUEEN
OF SCOTS TO QuANruM CRYPTOGRAPHY 332 (1999).
127. The Clinton Administration appears to recognize this problem. In the Cyber-
space Electronic Security Act of 1999, the Administration planned to authorize
$80 million for the FBI's Technical Support Center in an attempt to deal more
effectively with encryption use by criminals. See White House Fact Sheet for
Sept.16, 1999, The Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999 (visited Sept. 8,
2000), <http'/www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/
1999/9/16/16.text.l>. One possible method law enforcement officials may utilize
is known as a "tempest attack," which
aims to detect the distinct electromagnetic signals emitted by a com-
puter each time a letter is typed. If Eve parks a van outside Alice's
house, she can use sensitive tempest equipment to identify each individ-
ual keystroke that Alice makes on her computer. This would allow Eve
to intercept the message as it is typed into the computer, before it is
encrypted.
SINGH, supra note 126, at 318.
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to modify the export regulations. Even if the Ninth Circuit reverses
course now, the Bernstein decision has already helped set events in
motion to secure long-term victory for the proponents of liberal en-
cryption exports. That is not to say that subsequent decisions will not
define future battles or determine the government's ability to regulate
other emerging technologies, but in the case of encryption exports,
those who wanted to export are now free to do so in most cases.
Bernstein and the encryption export debate are also significant be-
cause they reveal the intersection of important societal interests. Is-
sues of this type force society to consider what interests it values most,
and they issue a challenge to find ways to balance fundamental values
of free speech and privacy with the critical interests of public safety,
economic stability, and foreign policy. As technology further perme-
ates the culture, issues that require such difficult weighing and bal-
ancing of values will continue to pose significant challenges for society
in the new millennium.
David McClure
